Transformation of the Iraqi Islamist Parties and their Framing in the Changing Regional and International Political Environments

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Dai YAMAO**

Let us unify all of your words and struggle together under the banner of Islam in order to salvage Iraq from the nightmare made by the ruling group and in order to reconstruct Iraq, in which the Islamic justice spreads, human dignity and freedom should be respected; where all the Iraqi people, regardless of their ethnic and sectarian differences, will feel that they are brothers who are contributing to ruling their state and building their nation together and realize the ideal Islamic models that are driven from our Islamic noble task—Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr.

I. Introduction

This paper attempts to demonstratively clarify the processes of and reasons for transformation in the framing of movements and strategies of Iraqi Islamist parties during the 1980s and early 1990s.

Iraqi Islamist parties attracted considerable attention after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Needless to say, they have crucial importance for understanding the politics and social structures in post-war Iraq. In addition, studying historical developments of their opposition movement can provide a new perspective for wider analysis of the Iraqi politics. However, insufficient research has been conducted both on the activities of these parties and their ideologies. Ādil Raʿūf, an Iraqi scholar, aptly points out that there are almost no detailed studies on the three biggest Islamist parties—the Islamic Daʿwa Party (Ḥizb al-Daʿwa al-Islāmiyya), the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (al-Majlis al-Aʿlā lī l-Thawra al-Islāmiyya fī al-ʿIrāq; hereafter, SCIRI), and the Islamic Task Organization (Munazzama al-ʿAmal al-Islāmi; hereafter, MAI) (Raʿūf 2000: 6).²

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² Part of the reasons scholar have not paid adequate attentions to this field is a lack of sources on Islamist movements due to various reasons. The Iraqi Center for Strategic Studies in Damascus clearly mentions that the reason for the lack of researches in Arabic is that scholars working on this topic, especially on the Daʿwa
Reviewing the studies of the Iraqi Islamist parties, firstly, researchers began studying this topic by analysing the socio-economic backgrounds of these Islamic movements (Batatu 1981; 1987; Baram 1990; 1991). In the next step of their studies, they emphasized on a comparison of the concerned Islamist parties (Baram 1994; Sakai 2001). Further, an attempt that served to enliven the analysis of the Iraqi Islamic movements was made on the basis of the social movement theory (Wiley 1992). In addition to such approached toward research, recent times have witnessed the presentation of case studies of the Da’wa Party (Yamao 2006; 2008). Subsequently, Faleh A. Jabar has presented an overview of the Shi’ite Islamic movements, emphasizing on the roles of middle-class non-ʻulamā’ merchants in the shrine cities, especially al-Najaf and Karbalā’ (Jabar 2003).

At the same time, detailed Arabic works of research on the Da’wa Party have gradually become available (al-Mu’min 1993; al-Khursān 1999; al-Shāmī 2006; Shubbar 2005; 2006). It is reasonable to estimate that, thus far, Jabar’s work is the most comprehensive and authorized contribution that uses a sizeable number of primary sources.

The research initiatives outlined above notwithstanding, the following hold good. First, partly because of the apparent scarcity of research and lack of sources, a majority of the activities of Iraqi Islamist parties remain unknown, especially these parties experiments in the 1980s—a period when most of them were operational in Iran. Information about their activities in the 1980s, as compared to those of other eras, is conspicuous by its absence. Most of the above-mentioned works deal with the activities of the Islamist parties of the 1970s without any mention of their activities in the 1980s. In the 1990s, as the international community began to pay attention to Iraqi opposition, various works of research began to make a mention of the Iraqi situation.

Second, many researchers analyse from the concept of class, which does not necessarily explain the transformation of Islamist parties during the period of exile, because their experiences during this period have nothing to do with social classes by cutting off from the supporters within the Iraqi society. Therefore, the historical transformation of Iraqi Islamist parties and the reasons for the same are yet to be analyzed in detail.

The Iraqi Islamist parties have changed their characteristics and strategies in the 1980s due to their experience of exile. This shift has a decisive significance in understanding their subsequent activities and policy orientations. In other words, analysis of their transformation in the 1980s and 1990s can testify interrelations among them as well as their attitudes and ideologies in the post-war period.

Hence, this paper sheds light on the transformation of framing of their movement caused by the changes of political opportunities; it attempts to clarify the processes of and reasons for transformation of the framings that justify, dignify, and

\footnote{Party, were in danger for their lives and had no guarantee of safety before the 1990s (MIID 1999: 7).}

\footnote{For example, see (Francke 1994).}
stimulate the movements and mobilizations of the Iraqi Islamist parties, from the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, by analyzing statements or discourses from published works of them. In the course of the analysis, this paper aims to demonstratively present that the Iraqi Islamist parties of the said period started to grow their notion of Iraq-ness—from trans-territorial notion to territory-defined political activities—, sharing it with other opposition groups, after changing the framing of their movements from Islamist solidarity to an alliance among Iraqi opposition groups transcending their Islamist circle. To this end, the following research question is answered in this paper:

How and why did the Iraqi Islamist parties change the framing of their movements from the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s?

In order to answer this question, the second section will outline the process of exiling of the Islamist parties as well as their attempts to achieve Islamist solidarity in order to obtain a better understanding of their subsequent movements. The third section will analyse how this unification atrophied and a new framing came into existence among the Iraqi Islamist parties. The last section will argue about the consequences of the emergence of the new framing of their movement.

II. Struggle for an Islamist Solidarity during Exile

This section will first outline the historical transformation of the Da’wa Party from its inception to its exile by focusing on the impact of the execution of its charismatic leader and its subsequent exile to Iran in order to obtain a better understanding of the activities and ideologies of the Iraqi Islamist parties in the 1980s. This will be followed by a clarification of the parties’ attempts to establish an organizational solidarity and share a common framing among the Iraqi Islamist parties in the 1980s.

1. Execution of a Charismatic Leader and the Beginning of a New Era
The modern organized Islamist political movement among the Shi’ite community in Iraq began with the foundation of the Da’wa Party in 1957 in the wake of the strong rise of secularism that was exemplified by the increasing influence of the Iraqi Communist Party (the ICP). The Da’wa Party was founded on the basis of reformist ‘ulamā’—those who

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4 There is no collective data or sources on ideologies and activities of the Islamist parties, especially those of the 1980s. Hence, I will use the pamphlets, leaflets, and official organs of the Iraqi Islamist parties in general, those of the Da’wa Party, the SCIRI, and the MAI in particular. See the primary sources in the reference.

5 There are conflicting opinions concerning to the formation of the Da’wa Party. These are divided into three opinions; all are dependent on views presented by members of the party in the formative period. On founding year, see; firstly, October 1957 presented by Şāliḥ al-Adīb and Kāẓim al-Hā’irī (‘Abd Allāh 1997: 17–18; al-Nu’mān 1997: 154; ‘Allāwī 1999: 37), secondly, late-summer of 1958 asserted by Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm (Wiley 1992: 32; Ja’far 1996: 511; al-Ḥakīm 2000: 227), and thirdly, 1959 argued by Tālib al-Rifā‘ī (al-Ḥusaynī 2005: 68–72). These differences relate to how the foundation process was understood. The first meeting to which founding members attended was held in al-Najaf in 1957, then they decided party
attempted to restore socio-political roles of Islam and the Shi‘ite religious establishment—, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr’s political thought that was expressed in his discourse, *The Bases of Islam* (*al-Usus al- İslāmîya*), which was used as a textbook for the party’s education (HDI 1981–89: vol.1, 235–40; vol.4, 45, 140, 176).

The Da’wa Party sought to expand the role of Islam in the Iraqi society and participate in the political arena within the existing Iraqi state. At the same time, it attempted to maintain links with the Shi‘ite religious establishment, even though the party did not only comprise Shi‘a members. It is worth mentioning there that the Da’wa Party was considerably moderate in its perspective, in terms of not searching for revolution, at least in the beginning.

However, this tendency gradually changed and became more revolutionary in nature as political and economic situations transformed after the formation of the Ba‘thist regime in 1968. An overview of the Da’wa Party’s documents provides us with justification to argue that the first wave of transformations arrived in the mid-1970s (MIID 1999: 26–27). The Ba‘thist regime started to suppress the Da’wa Party from the beginning of the 1970s onward. The oppression was concentrated on the supporters of al-Ṣadr and the Da’wa Party. Many Iranian students in *al-hawza* were expelled from Iraq, after being labelled Persian or members of the Da’wa Party (Ra‘ūf 2000: 118; 2001: 109). The Ba‘thist regime enforced a regulation that allowed it to execute a person solely on account of his being a member of the Da’wa Party (Regulation No. 461) (Ra‘ūf 2000: 121). At the peak of these oppressions, the regime executed five high-ranking mujtahids in the party leadership in December 1974 (al-Mu‘min 1993: 115–123; al-Khursān 1999: 211; Shubbar 2006: 125–145). This crippled the Da’wa Party—the party became like a headless body—as mentioned by al-Khursān (al-Khursān 1999: 188). In short, this chain of events significantly narrowed the political space of the Da’wa Party, to an extent where the party leadership was compelled to approve of the shift to the *political stage* (*al-Marḥala al-Siyāsīya*) officially, in which political struggle including armed battles, violent demonstrations, and mass movements against the regime supposed to be operated (HDI 1981–89: vol.4, 167). Although the party itself evaluated these movements as the political stage, it can be analyzed that the party transformed to the revolutionary movement as it mobilized the Iraqi masses enormously by asserting an Islamic

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6 On the details of the party’s activities in this formative period, see (Yamao 2006: 6; 2008: 244).
7 This is because al-Ṣadr emphasized that the ultimate aim was the formation of an Islamic state; however, revolutionary action was not permitted unless there were prospects for the success of an Islamic revolution (al-Ṣadr 2005a: 698–699).
8 The party document also points out that the mid 1970s was one of the important turning points of the party, especially 1974’s execution (HDI 1981–89: vol.4, 198–199).
9 The Da’wa Party divides its development into four stages: (1) ideological stage, (2) political stage, (3) revolutionary stage, and (4) stage of ruling revolutionary regime (HDI 1981–89: vol.1, 219–234; vol.3, 259–263).
revolution.

Hence, it was in the mid-1970s, not after the Iranian Revolution, when the Da‘wa Party adopted a revolutionary approach both in its activities and ideologies. The turning point of the revolutionary movement arrived when the authoritarian Ba‘thist regime heightened its oppression of the Da‘wa Party in the mid-1970s.

Subsequently, the Ba‘thist regime secretly executed al-Ṣadr in April 1980, fearing that he had the potential to mobilize Iraqi masses for an Islamic revolution\(^\text{10}\). Al-Ṣadr’s execution meant that Iraqi Islamists lost a charismatic spiritual leader. The movements of the Da‘wa Party and other Islamist parties had been well coordinated under his leadership until his execution. Moreover, the loss of the charismatic leader meant the loss of the talisman that unified activities of the Iraqi Islamist and their opinions (Ra‘ūf 2000: 310; al-Shāmī 2006: 187): the Iraqi Islamist movements lost their most important centripetal force\(^\text{11}\). This also implied the loss of the only figure that could collate various opinions and settle conflicts. This loss resulted not only in separations and segmentations in the Da‘wa Party but also in the Iraqi Islamist movements.

In this regard, the following four impacts can be highlighted. First, the chain of oppressions and executions forced a majority of the leading members of the Da‘wa Party and other Islamist organizations to go into exile. It was at this juncture that the Iraqi Islamist parties were faced with the second turning point, which required them to undergo a new phase: cut-off ties with their supporters in Iraq and go into exile.

Second, al-Ṣadr’s execution emboldened the militancy approach of the Da‘wa Party. Eight months before al-Ṣadr’s execution, the Da‘wa Party established a military base in Ahvaz, Khuzestan, in south-west Iran; the base was led by a newly founded party organization called the Committee of Jihad (Lajna Jihādiyya li-l-Da‘wa)\(^\text{12}\). After al-Ṣadr’s execution, this party’s base was renamed Martyr al-Ṣadr’s Military Base (Mu‘askar al-Shahid al-Ṣadr), which laid the foundation for the exile of the party’s leaders (al-Khursān 1999: 341–343; al-Shāmī 2006: 177)\(^\text{13}\). A multitude of military organizations

\(^{10}\) Behind this secret execution, it can be pointed out to the fact that the Iranian revolution accelerated the revolutionary movements within Iraq. After the Iranian revolution, al-Ṣadr openly asserted his support for the Iranian revolution (Ra‘ūf 2000: 137–138; al-‘Āmilī 2007: vol.4, 8–13). The Da‘wa Party and al-Ṣadr organized the Iraqi masses to overthrow the Ba‘thist regime (Ra‘ūf 2001: 163). The party declared that it was crucial to accomplish an Islamic revolution in Iraq, which must be guided by the party itself (SI Sep 3, 1980). The Da‘wa Party document maintains this circumstances aptly as follows: ‘Those responsible for al-Ṣadr’s murder know very well that he did not control the day-to-day affairs of the Islamic revolution in Iraq’ (DC Apr 1981, no. 12).

\(^{11}\) The impact of al-Ṣadr’s execution to members of the Da‘wa Party was expressed in the party document in the occasion of the first anniversary of his martyrdom by saying, ‘His absence from the political arena, particularly that of Iraq, has had the most devastating impact on the millions of Muslim youth, who regarded him not only as their spiritual father but as one of a kind a unique man who enriched Islam with unprecedented fresh thought and knowledge and engineered a unique pattern of insight into Qur’anic ideology’ (DC Apr 1981, no. 12).

\(^{12}\) Leading members of this committee were ‘Abd al-Mahdī, Fakhrī Mushkūr, and Šubjī al-Ṭufayrī (first secretary general of Hizb Allāh in Lebanon) (al-Khursān 1999: 342).

\(^{13}\) The Da‘wa Party document maintains these military activities as follows: ‘We are seeking inspiration from the martyrdom of Imam al-Ṣadr, in order to achieve the liberation of our land and our people in Iraq …
were rapidly founded within this military base, such as the *Higher Committee of Jihad* (al-Lajna al-Jihādi al-‘Ulyā), in which the future prime minister of Iraq—Ibrāhīm al-Ja‘farī—played an active role, and the *Martyr al-Ṣadr’s Force* (Quwwāt al-Shahīd al-Ṣadr) (al-Khursān 1999: 343–345).

Third, al-Ṣadr’s execution and the subsequent exile as well as the increasing militancy approach simultaneously brought the segmentation within the Iraqi Islamist movements. This segmentation shed light on the following problems: (1) competition for positions in party leadership, (2) conflict in opinions on revolutionary movements (comprehensive or incomprehensive) against the Ba‘thist regime, and (3) differences between methodologies to be adopted for the revolution (whether it should be conducted using the army and security apparatus). These issues caused antagonism among senior leaders (al-Khursān 1999: 370–371, 386–389)\(^1\). However, the most complicated and difficult problem was the selection of leadership that had the capacity to guide the Iraqi Islamist movements while inheriting al-Ṣadr’s legacies\(^2\). Table 1 presents comprehensive data pertaining to the Iraqi Islamist parties in the 1980s, after the segmentation of the Da‘wa Party (See Table 1).

Fourth, the loss of charismatic leader and the increasing segmentation paved the way for the institutionalization of decision–making especially within the Da‘wa Party. Now that the Da‘wa Party lost the charismatic figure that could collate various opinions and settle conflicts among them, the party document stressed that it had a *objective necessity* (al-‘darūrīya al-mawdū‘īyya) to organize the party structure to establish a *collective leadership* (al-qiyāda al-jamā‘īyya) for conducting effective activities (HDI n.d.a: 72–73, 103–104) (*italics* added). In order to determine this collective hierarchy in leadership, a decision was taken to introduce an electoral system in the party’s assembly held in Tehran in 1980 (HDI n.d.b: 87–153; al-Khursān 1999: 385–390; al-Shāmī 2006: 179–180). In this manner, the decision–making process was institutionalized within the Da‘wa Party as the organizational structure became solid—as shown in the Figure 1.

In short, the Iraqi Islamist movement that was represented by the Da‘wa Party changed into a revolutionary movement in the mid-1970s—a shift that was triggered by the secret execution of its charismatic leader. This unavoidably expedited the party’s segmentation and forced its members into exile at the beginning of the 1980s.

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\(^{1}\) Faleh A. Jabar mentioned, in a sense too excessively, that Iraqi Shi‘ite groups were extremely divided; they lacked any mechanism for pan-Shi‘ite, let alone pan-Iraqi, cooperation and representation (Jabar 2003: 235).

\(^{2}\) At that time, there were five possible figures—all of them were ‘ulamā‘—who seemed to have capacity; (1) Murtaḍā al-‘Askārī, senior leader of the Da‘wa Party, (2) Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm, pupil of al-Ṣadr, (3) Maḥmūd al-Ḥāshimi, al-Ṣadr’s brilliant pupil who had s strong linkage to the Iranian authority, (4) Muḥammad Bāqir al-Nāṣirī, and (5) Muḥammad Mahdī al-Īṣīfī, spokesman of the Da‘wa Party (*BI* 9 Apr 1988).
2. Struggle for Islamist Solidarity

In view of these circumstances, each Islamist party began to work toward restoring their solidarity. The foremost goal of these Islamist parties was to create an alternative organization in order to integrate a multitude of Islamist factions. On the one hand, various attempts were made by Iraqi parties to integrate factions, while on the other hand, the Iranian authority tried to intervene in these attempts.

Following to this trend, the *Union of Iraqi Militants ‘Ulamā’* (*Jamā‘a al-‘Ulamā’ al-Mujāhidīn fī al-‘Irāq*) was established. It comprised approximately 80 ‘ulamā’ under the command of Muhammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm and Māhmūd al-Hāshimī—both of whom were former members of the Da’wa Party and al-Ṣadr’s chief disciples. Subsequently, they formed the *Bureau of Islamic Revolution in Iraq* (*Maktab al-Thawra al-Islāmīya fī al-‘Irāq*), which subsequently served as the foundation for the establishment of the SCIRI (SCIRI 1984: 104–106). All these processes paved the way for the establishment of the SCIRI on 17 November 1982 (SCIRI 1983: 4–5; 1984: 106). The SCIRI is considered to be an umbrella organization of the Iraqi Islamist parties that were under the strong influence of the Iranian government (Jabar 2003: 239). In Tehran, upon the creation of the SCIRI, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm announced the following from the ‘Declaration of the SCIRI Formation’ (*al-Bayān al-Ta‘ṣīs li-l-Majlis al-A‘lā li-l-Thawra al-Islāmīya fī al-‘Irāq*):

> We are desperate for an Islamic revolution … It is indispensable to have a unified axis that guides the struggle effectively, and integrates the divisions of Islamic groups under a unified model, one banner, and one method … In order to achieve these aims, the SCIRI was established (SCIRI 1983: 18–19).

The SCIRI was established as an umbrella organization encompassing almost all the Shi‘ite Islamist parties, Kurdish Islamist parties, and a few Sunni Islamist parties. Indeed, no political party had a fixed membership or enforced regulations in the SCIRI (Ra‘ūf 2000: 364). From the organizational viewpoint, the SCIRI had the *Advisory Council* (*Majlis al-Shūrā*), comprising 16–17 members, which was equivalent to a

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16 First of all, Muṭṭalā al-‘Askarī, former supreme leader of the Da‘wa party, tried to integrate the Da‘wa Party and the *Iraqi Mujāhidīn Movement* (*Ḥarakat al-Mujāhidīn al-‘Irāqī*), but failed because he was the senior leader of the Da‘wa Party (Jabar 2003: 236).

17 The Iranian authority continued to provide asylum, financial, and organizational support to the Da‘wa Party members. This is partly because charismatic leader of the Da‘wa Party, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr had close relationship with Khomeini while he was exile in al-Najaf during the mid 1970s. Following his stance, the party supported Khomeini as well (Ra‘ūf 2001: 295; al-‘Āmilī 2007: vol.2, 42–51).

18 Jabar pointed out that the SCIRI combined the small but effective bureaucracy with traditional recruitment and mobilization: agitation of mass followers through a system of young representatives (*wkarā‘*) instead of Communist cell-type organization (Jabar 2003: 249). On the parties which attended to the SCIRI general assembly, see (Ra‘ūf 2000: 221–226, 305–316; 2002: 279–282; Jabar 2003: 236–248) (see also Table 5).
collective leadership. Hence, the Da‘wa Party and other minor parties/organizations came under the fold of the SCIRI, which became their representative organization and served as a contact point for the Iraqi Islamist parties. The Da‘wa Party welcomed the formation of the SCIRI in the following statement:

It [SCIRI] could be considered a legitimate entity and a natural claimant of the revolutionary process that is aiming at uprooting the corrupt and oppressive regime and establishing a system capable of fulfilling the hopes and aspirations of the masses in Iraq. … It is of paramount importance to clarify that the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI] is a culmination of efforts by sincere personalities within the Islamic movement to bring the Revolution a step closer to the achievement of the Islamic goals (DC Dec 1982, no. 32).

The formation of the SCIRI meant embodiment of the attempt for the reunification of the Iraqi Islamist parties to a certain degree, at least in an organizational sphere. The Iranian authority supported the SCIRI in order to use its help in the war against the Ba‘thist regime with its ideological sympathy. The SCIRI, in cooperation with the Iranian authority, held the conference of the Iraqi Islamist opposition movements at the Esteqlal Hotel in Tehran. At this conference, Ma‘hmūd al-Hāshimī (SCIRI chairman) prioritised the Islamic revolution, while Muhammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm (SCIRI spokesman) spoke about the unity of the Iraqi Islamist movements. Further, at this conference, the Iranian prime minister, Ḥoseyn al-Mūsavī, called on the SCIRI to make use of Iran’s experience in training specialist cadres and combat units, and maintained that the SCIRI might prove to be responsible for future generations of the Iraqi nation (FBIS 26 Nov 1984). This implied that the Iranian authority considered the SCIRI to be the representative of the Iraqi Islamist parties.

The SCIRI leaders often held meetings with high-ranking officers in the Iranian authority, such as President Ali Khamenei and Majlis Speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani; Khamenei appreciated the SCIRI’s initiative to mobilize Iraqi people in the war against

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19 The Da‘wa Party summarizes three responsibilities as follows: (1) To draw the line of the revolution in Iraq on the military and political level, (2) To take the relevant decisions at the critical moments of the revolution in its path to victory, and (3) To rally all the political forces within one line and to ensure their cooperation (DC Dec 1982, no. 32).

20 The Da‘wa Party maintained the formation of the SCIRI as follows, ‘it means re-unification of the Islamic movement of Iraq, which were unified under the Da‘wa Party before the execution of al-Ṣadr, and also contribute to direct all efforts towards a common goal on a common platform. Concerted efforts in the light of the new development will ensure that ambitions of the Iraqi people will, with the help of Allah, be realized’ (DC Dec 1982, no. 32). At the same time, the Da‘wa Party maintains as following: ‘the Council [SCIRI] also has duties to fulfill. Mandate will automatically be given to it once it reflects the resolve, firmness and decisiveness needed at this crucial stage’ (DC Dec 1982, no. 32).

21 The SCIRI stressed the importance in constructing strong relation to the Iranian authority by saying ‘our [SCIRI] attitude is the same as the Iranian government. In other words, it is important to fight jointly with the Iranian regime in order to overthrow the Ba‘thist regime’ (BI 1 Jan 1988).
the Ba‘thist regime (FBIS 6 Mar 1984). The SCIRI agreed with Rafsanjani to mobilize the Iraqi masses to the maximum degree (FBIS 5 Oct 1984)\textsuperscript{22}. In addition, the Iranian authority provided military training to the SCIRI; Maḥmūd al-Ḥāshimī inspected the training camp in Ahvaz where the militant unity of the SCIRI underwent training with the Iranian Basij Unit (FBIS 12 Nov 1985). It should be mentioned that the SCIRI repeatedly made declarations, addressing the Iraqi people to rise against the Ba‘thist regime and join the struggle to construct a new, free Iraq, in which an Islamic republic system would be established\textsuperscript{23}. Further, the SCIRI repeatedly stressed that it was the solitary, legitimate representative of the Iraqi people (FBIS 7 Mar 1983) (italics added)\textsuperscript{24}.

Looking at the power balance within the SCIRI, in the political sphere, intellectual lay members of the Da‘wa Party performed the crucial role of forging foreign relations for the SCIRI. Ibrāhīm al-Ja‘farī, one of the leaders in the Political Bureau of the Da‘wa Party, visited Libya and Syria as the head of the SCIRI delegation in order to build cooperative relationships between them and the Iraqi Islamist parties represented by the SCIRI (FBIS 7 Aug 1985; 12 Aug 1985). In the relationship with the Iranian regime, al-Ḥakīm and al-Ḥāshimī played a central role: Khamenei was supportive of al-Ḥakīm when he was in charge of liaison with Iraqi group (Jabar 2003: 237), Maḥmūd al-Ḥāshimī was appointed as a coordinator of an Islamic revolution in Iraq by the Iranian supreme leader, Khomeini\textsuperscript{25}.

Thus, it should be mentioned that although the Da‘wa Party and other Islamist parties cooperated in the struggle against the Ba‘thist regime under the umbrella of the SCIRI at least until the mid 1980s, the leading figures of the Da‘wa Party, al-Ḥakīm, and al-Ḥāshimī had a different kind of roles to play.

\textsuperscript{22} At the same time, the Da‘wa Party put a great emphasis on mobilizing the Iraqi masses; Some important factors in mobilizing the masses are as follows: (1) Dogma, religion or school of thought, (2) Direct occupational or colonial rule, (3) Accumulating oppression, (4) Social or political awareness on specific issues, and (5) Carefully planned instigation by an organization (DC Jan 1983, no. 33). In addition, the party summarized the methods of mobilization: (1) open and public discussions, (2) private communications, (3) distribution of leaflets, (4) strikes, (5) marches and demonstrations, (6) conferences, (7) picketing and hunger strikes, (8) armed rebellion, (9) declaration and statements, and (10) military coups (DC Mar 1983, no. 35).

\textsuperscript{23} The SCIRI addressed especially to the Iraqi army forces for betray the regime and join the Islamic forces. Moreover, it repeatedly emphasized the necessities of mobilizing the Iraqi masses for rise against the Ba‘thist regime. See (FBIS 17 Feb 1984; 23 Feb 1984; 15 Jun 1984; 5 Oct 1984; 5 Feb 1985; 22 Feb 1985; 12 Feb 1986).

\textsuperscript{24} There was huge Iraqi demonstration organized by the SCIRI in front of the Indian Embassy in Tehran in March 1983. They protested against the conference of Nonaligned Countries held in New Delhi in that year, to which delegation of the Ba‘thist regime participated as the representative of Iraq. The SCIRI asserted that the only legitimated representative of Iraq was the SCIRI (FBIS 9 Mar 1983) (Tehran Domestic Service 8 Mar 1983).

\textsuperscript{25} Obtained information from Dr. Matunaga Yasuyuki (TUFS, Iranian politics and religion). It was al-Ḥāshimī who was entrusted with the task of liaising with the Iranians shortly after the 1979 revolution (Jabar 2003: 238).
3. Framing Iraqi Islamism within the Iraqi Islamist Parties

The Iraqi Islamist parties attempted to mobilize their members and followers within Iraq by framing their movement as an Islamic revolutionary struggle for overthrowing the dictatorship, the Ba‘thist regime. The *Union of Iraqi Militants ‘Ulamā‘* expressed that the ultimate goal of its activities was to overthrow the Ba‘thist dictatorship, and asserted that this could be achieved only through armed struggle (JUMI n.d.a: 42; n.d.b: 14, 29; n.d.c: 3). Therefore, all Iraqi Islamist parties sought to stir an Islamic revolution and considered such a movement to be of utmost importance (MAI n.d.b: 12, 18; JUMI n.d.a: 17). They saw struggle for enemies of Islam, which was represented by Saddam’s dictatorship, as the goal of their activities.

In addition to the foundation laid by the ideological legacies of the late 1970s, the framing of movement was built on the groundwork of the following two issues, which were found in rhetoric or idioms of the Iranian revolution. First, the Iraqi Islamist parties started claiming that the Saddam regime was an ally of *World imperialism* (*al-imburiyāliya al-dawlīya*), for this reason, the Islamic struggle should be construed as anti-imperialism (SCIRI 1983: 7, 34; HDI 1983: 9; JUMI n.d.c: 25–26). As a colonial state, the U.S. attempted to oppress the movements of the weak by force; concretely, by imposing economic blockades (UDMI n.d.b: 57; n.d.c: 7–8; HMIy 1980: 12). Hence, it was crucial for the Islamist parties to struggle for the liberation of Islamic states from colonial domination and strengthen the Islamic revolution (HDI n.d.b: 14; UDMI n.d.b: 62–63). Second, they began to use the phrase ‘disinherited / oppressed people’ (*mustad’afīn*), thereby placing their activities in the domain of a wider struggle for the liberation of the oppressed people (SCIRI 1983: 35, 37; KITI n.d.: 5; HDI n.d.d: 32; UDMI n.d.b: 56).

Hence, in framing their movements, the Iraqi Islamist parties added new rhetoric such as anti-imperialism and the liberation of the oppressed people—considered as Iranian ideologies—as the pivots of their struggle against the dictatorship and efforts to fructify an Islamic revolution. A comparison of the ideologies of the Da‘wa Party in the

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26 Some of them asserted that rules of the Ba‘thist regime were similar to those of Fascism or Nazism (HMI n.d.d: 5, 12–13).

27 The Da‘wa Party maintained, ‘The kiss of the Great Satan may yet cause the demise of Saddam as it did of the Shah’ (*DC* Jul 1981, no. 15).

28 The use of such terminology seems to be an influence of the Iranian Revolution; this assumption is made because many of the parties asserted that Khomeini—the person who was known to use such expressions—could be the leader of the struggle of the *mustad’afīn* (MAI n.d.c: 17; HDI n.d.d: 31; UDMI n.d.d: 3; JI 1987: 10).

29 Mansoor Moaddel stressed the effectiveness of the symbols and workability of the metaphors that were found in the Iranian Revolution that enable it to become a dominant ideology, which defined *world imperialism* and the *Great Satan* as the main enemies of the revolution (Moaddel 1993: 216). With regard to the *mustad’afīn*, we were unable to find this terminology in the party documents before the Iranian Revolution, whereas one of main agitations in this revolution was the emphasis that underdevelopment and economic inequality are associated with Western cultural domination (Moaddel 1993: 154). On account of this rationale, Khomeini depicted society as sharply divided into two warring classes—the *mostaz‘efīn* against the *mostakberīn* (Abrahamian 1993: 26). Later, he popularized the concept of the *mostaz‘efīn* (Milani...
1960s and 1970s reveals that it did not asset to fight against the U.S imperialism nor did it claim the liberation of the poor using idioms such as the mustadʿaḥfīn (See Table 2). Therefore, this introduction of the Iranian rhetoric into the framing of their movement could be sail to be the defining features of their ideologies in the 1980s. A comprehensive picture of the ideologies of the Iraqi Islamist parties in the 1980s is shown in Tables 3 and Table 4.

An analysis of these ideological framings can demonstrate that each Iraqi Islamist party attempted unification within the framework of Islamism, by making alliances within Islamist parties, and not other organizations. This can be attested in the following statement made during the foundation of the SCIRI: ‘The SCIRI is not a political front (jabha) comprised of political parties and blocks, but it subsumes Islamic personalities (shakhṣīyāt Islāmīya) such as ‘ulamā’ and Islamic intelligentsia. It includes all existing Islamic forces (al-quwā al-Islāmīya al-mawjūda) regardless of persons and parties’ (SCIRI 1983: 21). Further, Muhammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm pointed out the necessity of Islamist solidarity in the following words: ‘At this stage, the roles that our Islamist parties are capable of playing are so wide that it is crucially important to unify all Islamist parties and organizations within a unified political framework’ (BI 9 Jul 1987).

In short, the Iraqi Islamist movements that were segmented at the beginning of exile, witnessed considerable efforts aimed at reunification, which resulted in the establishment of the SCIRI. The SCIRI intended to maintain unity among the Iraqi Islamist parties within the framework of Iraqi Islamism by emphasizing on revolutionary movement, although it was evidently open towards including all kinds of opposition forces.

[Table 2: Ideological Shifts of the Daʿwa Party (see Appendix)]
[Table 3: The Ideologies of the Iraqi Islamist Parties in the 1980s (see Appendix)]
[Table 4: The Chart of the Ideologies of the Iraqi Islamist Parties in the 1980s (see Appendix)]

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1994: 146). Khomeini reasoned that this was the reason why it is crucial to construct an Islamic society, which is depicted as an equal society in which the poor must accept their lot and not envy the rich; the rich should thank God, avoid conspicuous consumption, and donate generously to the poor (Abrahamian 1993: 26).

30 However, the Daʿwa Party often criticizes the British colonialism, because it recognized that it was the colonial power that created the ethnic, sectarian, and tribalism cleavages among the Iraqi society (HDI 1981–89: vol.1, 83–85; 434–441) [sentences I cited were published in 1976 (HDI 1981–89: vol.1, 79, 313)].
III. Weakening of the Unity under the Framework of Islamic Opposition

This section discusses the shift in the characteristics of the SCIRI from around the mid-1980s, which subsequently weakened the Islamist solidarity in the wake of the changes in international political situation. The latter part of this section will clarify that the Iraqi Islamist parties shifted their framework of activities from Islamism to Iraqi opposition.

1. Transformation of the Characteristics of the Iraqi Islamist Parties

The seemingly perfect situation seen in the mushrooming of cooperative relationships under the SCIRI’s umbrella did not last long. Things underwent a gradual change after the general assembly of the SCIRI that was held in January 1986. To begin with, the organizational structure of the SCIRI changed; its council was divided into two bodies: the Central Advisory Council (Majlis al-Shūrā al-Markazīyya) and the General Organization (al-Hay’a al-‘Āmma). In addition, the chairman, spokesman, and the Executive Committee (al-Lajna al-Tanfidhiyya), which had the substantial power in the SCIRI, were selected (Ra‘ūf 2000: 312). The chairman and spokesman exchanged their posts; that is, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm became the chairman, and Maḥmūd al-Hāshimī the spokesman (Jabar 2003: 238) (See Figure 2).

These shifts brought about three important changes to all the Iraqi Islamic movements. First, the monopoly of power of al-Ḥakīm in the SCIRI strengthened (Jabar 2003: 243). As Table 5 shows, the ratio of al-Ḥakīm family or pro-al-Ḥakīm members in the SCIRI’s Central Council increased by about 7–30% after the above-mentioned organizational change (see Table 5, note 5*2). Although it is extremely difficult to specify the accurate reason of the al-Ḥakīm’s monopoly due to the lack of primary sources, it is reasonable to speculate that al-Ḥakīm aimed at reconstructing an efficient organizational structure by these shifts, which unavoidably concentrated the power on him. The fact that Maḥmūd al-Hāshimī began to teach at Dars al-Khārijī class in Qom from 1981 and be away of real politics affected this monopolization of power. Removing the influential figures such as Bāqir al-Nāṣīrī and Kāẓīm al-Ḥā’īrī from the Central Advisory Council proves that al-Ḥakīm attempted to administer the organization smoothly (See Table 5).

Second, in the wake of this change, the main Iraqi Islamist parties such as the Da’wa Party and the MAI stopped contributing to the SCIRI’s activities (Ra‘ūf 2000: 317–319). According to the incumbent leadership of the Da’wa Party, this decision was made because of (1) the party’s will to avoid Iranian intervention and (2) its dislike for the monopoly of power of the al-Ḥakīm family, in particular, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm.

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31 He was in much higher rank than Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm in terms of theological and intellectual production.
33 Jabar pointed out that this aspect of the reshuffling suggests the new list of the Central Council was aimed at curbing the influence of strong clerics and replacing them with more convenient figures (Jabar 2003: 241).
Hence, the Da’wa Party came to be restricted in its role in decision making\(^{34}\). This separation resulted in providing greater financial support from the Iranian authority to the SCIRI as compared with other parties (Baram 1994: 548–549). This translated into a re-segmentation of unity of the Iraqi Islamist movement.

Third, in accordance with these two changes, the SCIRI came to attain a single-party organizational structure (See Figure 2). As a result, the Da’wa Party and the SCIRI began conducting their activities separately\(^{35}\). This conclusion is based on the following editorial in the SCIRI’s mouthpiece, which reluctantly recognized the existence of independent activities among Islamist parties: ‘There are now three important Iraqi Islamist parties, namely the Da’wa Party, the MAI, and the SCIRI. We have to make utmost efforts to re-unify these three parties because the segmentation of the three means the dispersion of our capabilities and powers’ (\textit{BI} 29 Oct 1987) \textit{(italics added)}. Further, the Da’wa Party resumed its own military operations that had been unified with those of the SCIRI before 1986. The party started actively attacking the Ba’thist regime using its own group called the \textit{Martyr al-Sadr Force}, which was under the purview of party’s special bureau, the \textit{Jihād Bureau} (\textit{al-Maktab al-Jihādī}) (\textit{BI} 1 Oct 1987). By the end of the Iran–Iraq War, the Da’wa Party and the MAI had begun to regard the SCIRI as an independent organization (Baram 1994: 548).

In sum, the SCIRI changed from being an umbrella organization to having a single-party structure by reducing the highly influential ‘ulamā‘ and establishing the monopoly of power to the hand of al-Ḥakīm; consequently, the Iraqi Islamist parties re-segmented and began conducting separate activities from around 1986, which weakened the unity among them.

[Figure 2: Structure of the SCIRI Umbrella Organization (see Appendix)]

[Table 5: Members of the SCIRI’s Central Council (see Appendix)]

\section*{2. Weakening of the Islamist Solidarity}

Against the backdrop of the above-mentioned shift in the characteristics of the Iraqi Islamist parties, more precisely, the re-segmentation of the SCIRI, many Iraqi Islamists

\(^{34}\) Author interview with Zuhair al-Nahīr (Director of International Relation, the Da’wa Party, whole Europe) and Muntadhar Najīm (Director of International Relation, the Da’wa Party, London); conducted on 9 Jun 2008 at the Da’wa Party’s office in London. Some researchers also argue the reason of the Da’wa Party’s separation. For example, Amatzia Baram mentioned that Muḥammad Bāqr al-Ḥakīm’s growing self-aggrandizement, which made cooperation with other movements difficult, found expression in the introduction during the late 1980s of a traditional ceremony in which delegations ‘renew an oath of allegiance’ to him by giving him the traditional Islamic \textit{bay’a} (Baram 1994: 549; Jabar 2003: 249).

\(^{35}\) Jabar mentioned that the Da’wa Party, the MAI, and the SCIRI has been sending their respective delegates as independent organizations in different events of political negotiations (Jabar 2003: 249). It seems that his argument is justified as the \textit{FBIS} do not provide any evidences of the Da’wa Party’s commitments to the activities of the SCIRI during 1986 to 1988. On the contrary, they approached to the Kurdish parties separately; the SCIRI started to cooperate to the PUK (\textit{FBIS} 10 Nov 1986), and the Da’wa Party emphasized the necessities to solve the Kurdish problems fairly and cooperate to their opposition movements (\textit{BI} 10 Sep 1987).
repeatedly appealed for the restoration of solidarity. Leading Iraqi ‘ulamā’—Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Nāṣīrī, and Muḥammad Mahdī al-‘Aṣīfī—stressed that it was crucially important to unify all the Iraqi Islamist parties (BI 30 Jul 1987). The SCIRI repeatedly emphasized on the reunification of the Iraqi Islamist movements after the separation, which testifies the facts that the Da’wa Party began conducting its activities separately from the SCIRI organization and that the leading members of the SCIRI were uneasy about this re-segmentation.

On the other hand, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍl Allāh—whose legal opinion members of mainstream in the Da’wa Party followed after al-Ṣadr’s execution—proposed to build a new arena for the unification of the Iraqi Islamist movements by creating political fronts such as the *Iraqi Political Front* (al-Jabha al-‘Irāqīya al-Siyāsīya) or the *Iraqi Islamic Political Front* (al-Jabha al-Islāmiyya al-Siyāsīya al-‘Irāqīyya) (BI 11 Jun 1987). This indicates that the Da’wa Party intended to create a new political forum different from the SCIRI, in order to unify the Iraqi Islamist movements.

However, once the segmentation within the SCIRI umbrella became manifest, a multitude of differences among the two parties were brought to light (see Table 6). Ideological differences between the Da’wa Party and the SCIRI were the most important in this regard. Although the SCIRI continued asserting complete support to Khomeini’s *Wilāya al-Faqīh* theory and the Iranian authority (SCIRI 1983: 35), the Da’wa Party expressed an ambivalent attitude towards Khomeini (HDI n.d.b: 148). On the one hand, the party asserted that it had been supporting Khomeini’s activities inside Iraq and the Iranian Revolution and that it was prepared to create a cooperative relationship with the Iranian authority (HDI n.d.d: 30–31), while on the other hand, the Da’wa Party simultaneously withheld complete support to Khomeini, as is evident from the following statement:

> The Da’wa Party is not out of Khomeini’s supreme domination. However, the party consults individual problems, which are specific to the party, to other jurisprudence (*al-faqīh al-jāmi’ li-l-sharā’ī*) of the party (HDI n.d.b: 148–149).

After the separation of the Da’wa Party form the SCIRI, this difference became evident in the form of a disagreement in political ideology and relationship with the Iranian authority. In relation to the ideological disagreement, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍl Allāh—spiritual leader of the Da’wa Party after al-Ṣadr—had this to say about the

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36 There were lots of examples: Muḥammad Bāqir al-Nāṣīrī pointed out a future of Iraq depend on a success of our Islamic movements, in other words, it depends whether our movements are able to unify and able to maintain it (BI 1 Oct 1987).

37 It is argued the biggest difference between the Da’wa Party and the SCIRI in terms of relation to the Iranian authority was on financial support. While the SCIRI depended heavily on Iranian financial support, the Da’wa party was self-funded (Baram 1994: 550).
theoretical differences in the political roles of the religious authority supporting al-Ṣadr’s ideas38.

Indeed, Imam Khomeini did not achieve the organized religious authority (al-marja’īya al-mu‘assasa). … Therefore, we have to realize the necessity to make the religious authority organized. This organized religious authority should be created on the basis of figure that is considered to be religious authority both by the religious establishment and Umma (BI 6 Dec 1990) (italics added).

In addition to the disagreement between the Da’wa Party and the SCIRI, there were issues among the leading members of the Da’wa Party on the manner in which a religious authority should rule a state and society. To be concrete, a confrontational situation was created between Muḥammad Mahdī al-ʿĀṣifī—the spokesman of the Da’wa Party—who was a devotee of the Wilāya al-Faqīh theory, and most other leading members who believed in the Objective Authority (al-Marja’īya al-Mawdūʿīya, or Institutionalized Authority) theory, which was advocated by their charismatic leader, al-Ṣadr39. In sum, contrary to the appeal for the reunification, the widening of mutual differences became manifest after the re-segmentation of the Iraqi Islamist movements.

[Table 6: A General Comparison—the Da’wa Party, the SCIRI, and the MAI—(see Appendix)]

3. Rise of a New Framing of the Iraqi Islamist Movements

In the middle of increasing segmentation among the Iraqi Islamist parties, the end of the Iran–Iraq War in 1988 spawned new circumstances. It seems that both the SCIRI and the Da’wa Party began deliberating on their future strategies just before the end of the Iran–Iraq War40. For the Iraqi Islamists, the year 1988 was a landmark in the 1980s. One of the leading figures of the Iraqi Islamist movements—Muḥammad Mahdī al-Ḥakīm—was assassinated in Khartoum in January (BI 21 Jan 1988). The senior ‘ulamā’ leadership of the Da’wa Party was expelled through the abolishment of the Jurisprudence Council (al-Majlis al-Fiqhī) and the arrival of new generation to party leadership (al-Khursān 1999: 410–411)41. Furthermore, the end of the Iran–Iraq War in August subsequently led to the reduction in the Iranian support to the Iraqi Islamist movements.

In April 1988, Muḥammad al-Ḥaydarī, a leading member of the SCIRI’s Central Advisory Council, strongly stressed the need to unify the Iraqi Islamist movements (BI 21 Apr 1988). This was the last call for unity within the framework of the Islamist parties.

38 This Faḍl Allāh’s statement was exactly the same as al-Ṣadr’s later political though. See (al-Ṣadr 2005b; Yamao 2007).
39 Author interview with Zuhair al-Nahīr (Director of International Relation, the Da’wa Party, whole Europe) and Muntadhar Najim (Director of International Relation, the Da’wa Party, London); conducted on 9 Jun 2008 at the Da’wa Party’s office in London.
40 See their party organs, such as (BI 28 Jul 1988; 18 Aug 1988).
41 On detail, see (Yamao 2008; 252–254).
Subsequently, the SCIRI began appealing for unity or alliance within the framework of Iraqi opposition movement. The stronger tendency can be found in the Da'wa Party; in its political statement, it exhorted all Iraqi people and organizations to join the opposition in a common fight against the Ba'thist regime (BI 18 Aug 1988). Moreover, the editorial in the SCIRI’s mouthpiece categorically maintained that the struggle of the Iraqi Islamist movements had entered into a completely new stage wherein the Iraqi Islamist parties had to seriously discuss the establishment of new relationships with other Iraqi opposition movements such as those of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and Kurdish parties such as the KDP and the PUK, in order to create a common political program (BI 15 Sep 1988)\(^42\).

In sum, the Iraqi Islamist parties clearly appealed for an alliance with all Iraqi opposition groups beyond their Islamist circle. The trials to form a framework of joint struggle of the Iraqi opposition were initiated among Kurdish groups and leftist organizations from the 1970s in Syria\(^43\). The Islamist parties took notice of these experiences in Syria after the end of the Iran–Iraq War. The first clear proposal came into public view when Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḩakīm officially visited Syria and discussed with the Syrian president Ḥāfīẓ al-Asad about the need to create a framework for joint action (ʻamal mushtarak) within Iraqi opposition groups (BI 10 Nov 1988)\(^44\).

In this manner, the leadership of various Iraqi opposition movements such as the SCIRI, the KDP, the ICP, and the Iraqi Regional Council of the Ba‘th Party began their negotiations in Damascus, in order to form a committee for joint action and a charter for a united Iraqi national front (mithāq al-jabha al-waṭaniyya al-‘Irāqiyya al-muwāḥḥad) (BI 29 Dec 1988)\(^45\). It is reasonable to estimate that the Iraqi Islamist parties began to have discussions on cooperation with other opposition parties after the end of 1988 or the beginning of 1989.

Such a clear transformation of the framework of alliance found in the proclamation of the Iraqi Islamist parties could be attributed to the fact that they, especially the SCIRI, had to face a new challenge in the form of the withdrawal of Iranian support as the Iran–Iraq War was over. Moreover, because of the shift in the SCIRI’s

\(^{42}\) Furthermore, the SCIRI considered necessities to form an alliance in a wider framework including non-Islamist parties (BI 8 Jun 1989).

\(^{43}\) The trials to make alliances were initiated among the Iraqi Regional Council of the Ba‘th Party, other Arab nationalist groups, and mainstream faction of the ICP. The PUK took part in the alliance in 1976, which became the Nationalist Democratic Front (Jabha al-Waṭanī al-Qawmi al-Dimqrāṭī) in 1980. On the other hands, the KDP, the ICP, and the Kurdish Socialist Party formed the Iraqi Democratic Front in 1982 (FBIS 29 Apr 1982; Sakai 1998: 80).

\(^{44}\) However, it seems that the SCIRI wanted to create a new assembly-typed organization similar to the SCIRI’s organization, in which the SCIRI itself can play a central role of the opposition movements (BI 10 Nov 1988).

\(^{45}\) This brought the conference in February 1989 in Damascus to which the KDP, the PUK, the Kurdish Social Party, the Kurdish Communist Party, the Iraqi Regional Council of the Ba‘th Party, and other nationalist parties as well as the Islamist parties such as the Da‘wa Party, the SCIRI, and the MAI participated. They started to discuss in order to create the Charter of Joint Action (Mithāq al-ʻAmal al-Mushtarak) (BI 9 Mar 1989). This would finally be the JAC based on the Iraqi National Movements (al-Ḥaraka al-Waṭaniyya al-ʻIrāqiyya) acting in Damascus.
characteristics in 1986, the Iraqi Islamist movements were re-segmented, which revealed a limitation of the workability of the Islamist framework. Subsequently, the framing of their movements emphasizing unity among Iraqi opposition groups began to manifest.

IV. Change in Direction toward the Iraqi Opposition Framework beyond the Islamist Solidarity

This section will first outline the unaccustomed problems that have emerged in the wake of change in international and domestic politics, in order to understand the reasons for and process of change in the framing of the Islamist parties. It will also discuss about the outcomes and meanings of this change in their framing.

1. Drastic Change in International and Domestic Politics

The turbulent changes in international and domestic political environment after the end of the Iran–Iraq War in 1988, in the form of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the subsequent outbreak of the Gulf War on 17 January 1991, forced the Iraqi Islamists to completely reconsider their strategies. The sudden outbreak of the uprising of March 1991 (hereafter, the Sha‘bān Uprising)\(^{46}\) expedited this rethinking.

It is reasonable to assume that the declining incentives of extending support to the Iraqi Islamist movements by the Iranian authority after the end of the Iran–Iraq War led to the activities of the Iraqi Islamist being shifted to Syria. Even the SCIRI, which was considered to have a strong relationship with the Iranian authority (Bengio 1985: 12; Fuller and Francke 1999: 109–111), began discussing the possibilities of the hollowing out of its strong linkage with the Iranian authority and the loss of support from Iran (\(BI\) 22 Feb 1990)\(^ {47}\). Hence, they began to pursue their activities intensively in Syria, where the Syrian government permitted their activities and provided them with support\(^ {48}\). As mentioned earlier, the SCIRI continued its negotiations with the Syrian president Ḥāfīz al-Asad that were started in September 1988 and dispatched a delegation to meet al-Asad on 22 December 1991, after he had proposed his support to Iraqi opposition movements (\(NR\) 28 Dec 1991). In other words, the foothold of the Iraqi Islamist parties shifted to

\(^{46}\) This uprising is called by various names by various actors. For instance, members of the ICP usually call ‘the Uprising of March 1991’ (\(Intifāda ʻAḥār\)). On the other hands, most of the Iraqi Islamist calls it the ‘Sha‘bān Uprising’ (\(Intifāda Sha‘bān\)), although it was initially called ‘the Popular Uprising’ (\(Intifāda Sha‘bīya\)). It seems that the Islamist started to use this Sha‘bān Uprising from around Jun 1991, three months after the beginning of the uprising (\(NR\) 27 Jun 1991).

\(^{47}\) The Iran’s decreasing incentives of supporting the Iraqi Islamist parties can be observed by the fact that the Iranian authority did not allow the SCIRI’s attack crossing the Iranian border for helping the Sha‘bān Uprising (Sakai 1998: 78).

\(^{48}\) The relationship between the Iraqi Islamist parties and the Syrian government was initiated in 1985 by negation of the SCIRI’s delegation, which was headed by the Da‘wa Party’s leading figure Ibrāhīm al-Ja‘farī. After this negotiation, the SCIRI established the new branch in Damascus, Syria (\(FBIS\) 7 Aug 1985; 12 Aug 1985) (\(IRNA\) 7 Aug 1985; 11 Aug 1985; \(Tehran International Service\) 11 Aug 1985).
Damascus from Tehran.

As the international and domestic politics changed drastically, Iraqi opposition movements began drawing considerable attention from the international community by means of international media. The Western countries, which had been supporting the Ba'athist authoritarian regime as a breakwater against the Iranian Islamic revolution, started taking the activities of Iraqi opposition seriously, in order to fight against the Saddam regime. In accordance with this, the Iraqi Islamist parties began to recognize the need to appeal for their cause before the international community by going beyond the activities within Iran (BI 25 Jul 1991), which promoted active debates on a tie-up with other Iraqi opposition organizations that based abroad rather than Iran (BI 15 Jan 1991).

Along with these transitions, the Iraqi Islamist parties had to face the new challenges, especially after the Sha'bān Uprising; namely ethnic and sectarian conflict and discrimination within the Iraqi society. In other words, a feeling of sectarianism stemming from ethnic and sectarian divides or cleavages became evident within the Iraqi society. As ‘Ādil Ra‘ūf, an Iraqi scholar, aptly points out, the Ba’thist authoritarian regime strengthened its sectarian inclination after the severe oppression on the Sha'bān Uprising, which created a 'sectarian civil war' (al-fitna al-tā‘īfīya) (NR 6 Sep 1991), although it was temporary phenomenon. Isam al-Khafaji’s analysis of these development points that the Ba’thist regime did not invent the ethnic, religious, sectarian, regional and tribal cleavages in the Iraqi society; however it did perpetuate and exacerbate these cleavages rather than working to overcome them (al-Khafaji 1994: 26).

Given these sectarian tendencies, the Iraqi Islamist parties started critiquing the regime’s sectarianism in their statements. On one occasion, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm criticized the growing sectarianism by remarking that there were graffiti saying 'No more Shī‘a from today' (lā Shī‘a ba‘da al-Yawm), which were found in the tanks of the Iraqi army in the south (NR 12 Jul 1991; 6 Sep 1991).

In short, changes in international and domestic political situations, especially the

49 Francke points out that the transformation of international opinion from hostility to sympathy and of Iraqi popular sentiment from fear and apathy to active condemnation, combined to strengthen the Iraqi opposition in exile (Francke 1994: 155).

50 In addition, the Ba’thist regime faced the political and economic crisis as Alnasrawi mentions ‘it can be seen from these indications that by 1990 the Iraqi economy had reached a dead end, with no prospect for recovery’ (Alnasrawi 1994: 78).

51 Eric Davis points out that inside Iraq, ‘sectarian feelings expressed during the Intifāda (Sha’bān Uprising), manifest in graffiti on Republic Guard tanks that declared ‘No more Shi’a after today’ (Lā Shī‘a ba‘d al-yawm)’ (Davis 2005: 228). In this manner, the word ‘Shī‘a’ which had been almost totally absent from political discourse entered the vocabulary of Iraqi politics (Davis 2005: 228). Moreover, the regime tried to divide the Shi’a itself into respectable religious Shi’a, on one hand, and lower-class, even déclassé, elements, on the other, who do not conform to social standards (Davis 2005: 243). In addition to this sectarian tendency, the Ba’thist regime made the religious authority Abū Qāsim al-Khū‘ī being under house arrest, which made the Iraqi Islamist get angry. Subsequently, Maḥmūd al-Hāshimi, Kāẓim al-Hā‘īr, and Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm jointly proclaimed the statement against al-Khū‘ī’s arrest (BI 28 Mar 1991).

52 The Islamist parties seemed to realize that they need a unified leadership regardless of the ethnic and sectarian differences as Jabar points out the Uprising would need a sober and highly disciplined leadership to overcome the ethnic, religious and communal fragmentation of the Iraqi nation (Jabar 1994: 106).
outbreak of the Sha'bān Uprising, which were perceived as political opportunities to expand Iraqi opposition movements, ushered in a set of new persuasive framing of the Iraqi Islamist parties. It was at this juncture that the Iraqi Islamist parties significantly emphasized on solidarity among Iraqi opposition groups. The change in the framing of the movements in the late 1980s paved the way for this development.

2. From the Islamist Solidarity to the Iraqi Opposition Framework

In the wake of significant changes in the socio-political situation in the international and domestic spheres, the attempts to framing a new movement by appealing for alliance among Iraqi opposition groups bore fruit at the beginning of the 1990s. In other words, the Iraqi Islamist parties enhanced this framing by holding conferences with other groups in Damascus: they held the conference in al-Sayyida Zaynab—a Shi‘ite shrine city located in the south of Damascus, Syria—which was attended by both Islamist and nationalist parties. They reached an agreement to create a political program, which should become a common charter (BI 5 Apr 1990)\textsuperscript{53}.

After this development, the re-segmented relationships among the Iraqi Islamist parties, more precisely, between the Da‘wa Party and the SCIRI, ostensibly seemed to be repaired to some extent. They re-opened a meeting together, which was attended by almost all the leading figures from both side such as Abū Jalāl al-Aḏīb (the Da‘wa Party), Muḥammad al-Ḥaydari (the SCIRI), and Muḥṣin al-Ḥusaynī (the MAI). They emphasized on conducting a joint struggle in the Joint Political Statement (al-Bayān al-Sīyāsī al-Mustārak) as is evident in the following statement: ‘we have to stress on its political announcement as follows: It is now necessary that the Iraqi Islamic movements should unify their political stances and perceptions by ensuring wider cooperation’ (BI 4 Oct 1990).

These activities can be considered to be stratagems of the Iraqi Islamist parties for constructing a new framing for their movement—transcending their Islamist circles, the struggle against the dictatorship by unifying all Iraqi opposition groups and complying with political changes. All these activities paved the way for a new era of alliance among Iraqi opposition groups.

These developments reached their zenith with the creation of the Joint Action Committee (Lajna al-‘Amal al-Mustārak; hereafter, JAC) on 27 December 1990, which had an official statement called the Common Statement (al-Bayān al-Mustārak) (BI 15 Jan 1991; NR 13 May 1991). After this, a number of conferences were held for preparing a joint political platform for entire Iraqi oppositions (BI 28 Feb 1991)\textsuperscript{54}.

\textsuperscript{53} They often held their meetings or conferences in al-Sayyida Zaynab: see, for instance, the Iraqi opposition conference in February 1991 (BI 14 Feb 1991).

\textsuperscript{54} For example, the SCIRI had a meeting with Kurdish leadership discussed repeatedly on the purposes of their movements, which brought the following agreement with regard to the aims: (1) Islam is the religion of the Iraqi people regardless of their ethnicities such as Arab, Kurd, and Turcoman, (2) human right of the Iraqi people should be respected regardless of their ethnic and sects, (3) human right movements should be
The JAC expedited its activities for unifying Iraqi opposition groups for the fight against the Ba’thist regime. It held a conference in Beirut between 11 and 13 March 1991, which was attended by approximately 500 Iraqis from 23 organizations. The slogan of the meeting was ‘Our unity guarantees liberation from the dictatorship, maintains the unity of our nation, and ensure our victory in achieving the alternative chosen by Iraqi people (waḥdat-nā ḍamāna li-khilāṣ-nā min al-diktāṭūrīya wa šiyāna li-waḥda waṭan-nā wa intiṣār li-l-badīl alladhī yakhṭār-hu ša’b-nā)’ (NR 13 Mar 1991; BI 28 Mar 1991). The declaration that was made in the conference stressed on the following five needs: (1) overthrow the Saddam’s authoritarian regime, (2) unify the Iraqi opposition parties, organizations and struggle jointly for freedom, (3) struggle against any outside intervention that could tear divide the Iraqi state, (4) form a transitional government in which all parties have the right to participate, and (5) construct a regime that guarantees political participation, freedom, and constitutional democracy (NR 13 Mar 1991).

Abū Jalāl al-ʿAdīb, a leading figure of the Da’wa Party, remarked that this conference was held with the common aim of providing a unified direction for opposition movements regardless of sectarian and ethnic differences (BI 13 mar 1991). The editorial of the SCIRI’s organ saw the Beirut conference as a historical achievement because it was the first occasion where all the Islamist parties assembled within the framework of an Iraqi national movement (al-ḥaraka al-waṭanīya al-‘Irāqīya) (BI 18 Apr 1991): the event was considered epochal due to the widespread participation of Iraqi opposition organizations (Sakai 1999: 78).55

In addition to organization of conferences, the JAC often sent its delegation to garner support from various international organizations and countries. A delegation headed by Jawād al-Mālikī (the Da’wa Party), Abū Amīr (the MAI), ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Ṣāfī (the ICP), and ‘Īzz al-Dīn Barwārī (the KDP) was sent to France with a view to securing French support for the Iraqi opposition movement and Iraqi people (BI 9 May 1991).

We may regard JAC’s Beirut conference as the pinnacle of the efforts of Iraqi opposition movements to ensure unity beyond ideologies, ethics, and sects. This trend was evidently contributed to a new approach among the Iraqi Islamist parties to some extent56. However, this novel approach was clearly very different from that adopted in the early 1980s, because the framing of their movement had shifted from one that strived for the solidarity of the Iraqi Islamism to one that espoused an alliance of the entire Iraqi opposition groups as well as the bridging of growing differences that appeared after the

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55 The JAC conference of Beirut was epoch-making event in the sense that all Iraqi opposition including the ICP, Arab nationalist groups, Kurdish parties, Islamist parties as well as pro-American liberalist group such as the Iraq Free Council headed by Šāliḥ al-Jabr (Sakai 1998: 80).

56 For example, Bayān Jabr—the chairman of the SCIRI’s Damascus branch—and Jawād al-Mālikī—the chairman of the Da’wa Party’s Damascus branch and the future prime minister of Iraq—jointly attend the press conference in Damascus after the Beirut conference (NR 27 Mar 1991).
re-segmentation in the mid-1980s. Hence, the unification that was sought under the SCIRI umbrella did not feature among their aims for the 1990s.

3. Framing the Entire Iraqi Opposition
As discussed earlier, the Iraqi Islamist parties shifted the framing of their movement from one that strived towards the Islamist solidarity to one that desired an alliance of Iraqi opposition groups as a whole. Given this, what were the characteristics of their framing? It is reasonable to mention two important points in an analysis of their framing of mobilization.

First, in view of the rise of sectarian feeling within the Iraqi society, the Iraqi Islamist emphasized on the necessity to overcome it. Therefore, they strongly opposed both sectarianism within Iraq and sectarian inclinations among them. At the formation of the JAC, the Iraqi Islamist parties stressed that the JAC was formed for the benefit of all Iraqi people, regardless of ethnic identities and sects (BI 15 Jan 1991). To overcome sectarianism, it was imperative to forge alliances with groups of other sects. Hence, constructing an arena wherein all Iraqi opposition groups could jointly struggle and overcome existing sectarian inclinations became essential in framing their movement. This is the reason why the Jurisprudence Council (al-Majlis al-Fiqhī)—an organization formed from the Da'wa Party—emphasized that it was most important to unify and combine all the Iraqi opposition movements regardless of ideologies, sects, and ethnicities (BI 28 Feb 1991); further Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥākīm stressed that it was extremely important to unify Iraqi opposition movements by overcoming differences between sects and ethnicities (NR 29 May 1991).

Second, forging an alliance among Iraqi opposition groups by proclaiming a way of liberation from the common enemy, the Ba'thist authoritarian regime, fostered a feeling of Iraq-ness—the sense that they belong to Iraqi people and Iraqi organizations, which has some sort of patriotism or the notion of territory-defined political sense. The Sha'bān Uprising strengthened this feeling. This nationalistic inclination was found in expression in framing of the Islamist parties in two different ways: (1) engendered necessity of cooperation and (2) opposed the U.S. intervention.

(1) On one hand, as discussed earlier, the Iraqi Islamist parties chose to cooperate with other opposition groups, which made them refrain from stressing their Islamist ideologies, let alone the Shi‘ism. Hence, Abū Jalāl al-Adīb, a leading figure of the Da'wa Party, maintained the following: ‘The Sha'bān Intifāḍa is not monopolized by one organization. … What we have to do now is create a joint committee outside of Iraq, which subsequently will unify or combine all opposition movements and support the Intifāḍa inside Iraq’ (NR 7 Mar 1991). This necessity of cooperation would generate a strong feeling of Iraq-ness.
(2) On the other hand, the U.S. intervention of Iraq developed a strong sense of Iraq-ness in the Islamist parties. In other words, the invasion by foreign power to their homeland brought about their sentiment toward their homeland. As was evident, the fact that the Iraqi Islamist parties based in Damascus jointly issued a statement against the U.S. intervention of Iraq bore evident that the long-time enemy from the 1980s elicited a feeling of Iraq-ness. Almost all the Islamist parties were against the U.S. invasion because they considered that the U.S. presence might prolong the Saddam’s authoritarian regime. The SCIRI maintained its stance on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and possibilities of the U.S. intervention in the following slogan: ‘Against Saddam’s invasion, against distraction of Kuwait, and against foreign intervention in the area’ (lā li-l-ijtīḥād al-Ṣaddāmī li-l-Kuwayt, lā li-l-tadakhkhul al-ajnabī fi al-mintaqā), because the U.S. presence in the Gulf region could have infringed upon Iraq’s sovereignty and independence (sīyāṣa wa istiqlāl) (BI 9 Aug 1990). It was argued that the Saddam regime was supported by foreign power and continued because of this support (BI 5 Mar 1992).

Analyzing the framing of the Iraqi Islamist parties proves that they succeeded, to some extent, in fostering the sense of Iran-ness through the experiences of gathering with other opposition groups. It is now obvious that each Islamist party agreed the anti-U.S. sentiment and the need to construct an alliance overcoming the sectarianism.

However, contrary to the Da’wa Party’s cooperative stance that refrained itself from calling Islamist policies, the fact that Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm (the SCIRI) was eager to regard the Shaʿbān Uprising as ‘Islamic revolution’ (thawra) unavoidably provided negative impressions to other secular opposition parties. This difference of

57 The SCIRI, the Daʿwa Party, the MAI, the Iraqi Mujāhidīn Movement, the Union of Iraqi Militant ‘Ulamāʾ, and the Turcoman Islamic Union joint this statement (NR 26 Jul 1991).
58 The MAI criticized the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by arguing that this invasion did cause the intervention of the foreign power—which was unfortunately led by the U.S. army—to the Islamic world (BI 31 Jan 1991).
59 Although Jabar indicates that the opposition movement deeply underestimated the extent to which Saddam regime had succeeded in forging a new Iraqi patriotism of national self-defense during the Iran–Iraq War (Jabar 1994: 97), it is justified to argue that the Islamist parties did succeed in creating some sort of nationalistic feeling.
60 He maintained that the Shaʿbān Uprising should be controlled and guided by Islam (NR 7 Mar 1991; 13 Mar 1991). Facing to the criticism, the SCIRI had to clarify its stance on this issue by remarking that ‘it did not have any intention of constructing a new government in which the SCIRI had a central power. On the contrary, it had a strong desire to form the regime which represents various opinions of
attitudes toward other Iraqi oppositions reflects the re-segmentation from the mid-1980s between the Da‘wa Party, which came to devote to foster an alliance with Iraqi opposition groups, and the SCIRI, which after all persisted in the Islamic revolution.\footnote{Moreover, a sense of distance to other Iraqi opposition groups was different between the Da‘wa Party and the SCIRI. The Da‘wa Party maintained even in the beginning of the 1980s on the relationship with other opposition forces that have different ideologies other than Islamism as follows: ‘Our attitudes towards those who do not adopt Islamic ideas but take a clear line against the western influence in our areas is to be based on what is most beneficial to the Muslim people and on the specific circumstances of each case’ (DC Dec 1982, no. 32). On the other hand, the SCIRI did not start to present the similar opinion until the end of the Iran–Iraq War.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Revolution</th>
<th>Exile in the 1980s</th>
<th>Exile/Diaspora in the 1990s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>Unified</td>
<td>Segmented</td>
<td>“Re-unified”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing</td>
<td>Islamic revolution, solidarity of the Islamist parties</td>
<td>Alliance of Iraqi Opposition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Made my author.

V. Conclusion

After the loss of their charismatic leader and resulting segmentation during the period of exile, the Iraqi Islamist parties strived for unity. During their exile in Iran, they constructed the framing of their movements by emphasizing on the Islamist solidarity in order to overthrow the dictatorship and establish an Islamic state in Iraq.

However, this bond of the Islamist solidarity in the organization sphere weakened as the characteristics of the SCIRI changed and the decision-making power came to be monopolized by the al-Ḥakīm family. Further, the end of the Iran–Iraq War made them, particularly the leading figures of the SCIRI, realize that their framework of the Islamist solidarity was not efficient.

Consequently, the Iraqi Islamist parties shifted the framing of their mobilization the Iraqi people’ (NR 7 Mar 1991).
by placing emphasis on the unification of the Iraqi opposition. In other words, they made appeals for an alliance of Iraqi opposition groups that extended beyond the Islamist solidarity. Turbulent changes in international, regional, and domestic politics amplified the appeals that called for an alliance of the entire Iraqi opposition. Faced with a new political opportunity—the Sha'bān Uprising—, the Iraqi Islamist parties added two additional factors to their framing, (1) wiping out of sectarianism and (2) a sense of Iraq-ness. Efforts in this direction culminated in the 1991 Beirut conference that witnessed participation from almost all the Iraqi opposition groups. In this manner, the Iraqi Islamist parties succeeded in fostering the sense of Iraq-ness or some sort of patriotism especially by stressing anti-foreign intervention and by making the alliance with other Iraqi opposition groups.

However, in constructing the concrete relationship with other opposition groups, the difference that had become tangible in the late-1980s among the Iraqi Islamist parties began to rear its head. This difference had possibilities of destroying the frangible alliance among the Iraqi Islamist parties as well as that of the entire Iraqi opposition groups.
### Appendixes

#### Table 1: A Classification of the Iraqi Islamist Parties in the 1980s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>Parties/Organizations</th>
<th>Founded</th>
<th>Outlines/Characteristics</th>
<th>Core Members</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factions from the Da’wa Party</td>
<td>Factions in Early Period</td>
<td>The Soldier of Imam (Jund al-Imām)</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>The oldest faction of the Da’wa Party, which was caused by confrontation between Sāmī al-Badrī (in charge of east Karādī region) and Ṭārīf al-Baṣrī (leadership of whole Baghdad branch). It started activities by al-Badrī from around 1977. It has a radical ideology based on Sayyid Quṭb’s Jihād theory, which is arranged to be consistent to the Shi’ite jurisprudence. It asserts formation of an Islamic state and preparation for the second coming of Imām al-Mahdī. Headquarters are in Damascus and Europe.</td>
<td>- Laṭīf Ḥafiẓ al-Ṣābi’ (supreme leader; living in Damascus), - Ḥizam Ṣāhābānī (living in Damascus), - Sa’d Jawād (living in London), - Abū Zayd (living in Holland)</td>
<td>Integrated to the SCIRI</td>
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<td>The Iraqi Mujāhidīn Movement (Haraka al-Mujāhidīn al-ʿIrāqīyīn)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Founded by militant factions of the Da’wa Party. It claims armed struggle. It is based in Teheran, but has relatively strong linkages to guerrillas movements inside Iraq, which reported circumstances every month. It is incorporated into the SCIRI structure from the mid-1980s.</td>
<td>- Mahdī al-Hakīm (assassinated in Khartoum in 17 January 1988) , - Ṭārīf al-ʿAzīz al-Hakīm</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Islamic Da’wa (al-Ḍawa wa al-Islāmīyya)</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Factions of the Da’wa Party which was based on the al-Baṣrī branch, and supported Ṭārīf al-Baṣrī. It starts to claim that the party should not introduce electoral system for deciding leadership, and then split for autonomy.</td>
<td>- Ṭārīf al-Ḥadīd</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Factions in Later Period</td>
<td>The Jurisprudence Council (al-Majlis al-Fiqḥī)</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Founded by the members of the Jurisprudence Council (al-Majlis al-Fiqḥī) in February 1984. It is decided to abolish this Jurisprudence Council in the general assembly in January 1988, and its leader Kāẓīm al-Ḥā’irī is defeated in election of leadership. He withdraws from the party and founds this council.</td>
<td>- Kāẓīm al-Ḥā’irī - Mahdī al-ʿĀṣīfī - Muḥammad ‘Aṣīr al-Tāṣhīlīfī (all living in Qom, Iran)</td>
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<td>The Iraqi Army for Liberation of Iraq (al-Jaysh al-Īṣāmī li-Tahrīr al-ʿIrāq)</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Founded by Muḥammad al-ʿAskārī, one of the supreme leaders of the Da’wa Party, in order to unify Iraqi Islamic organizations.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>The Movement of Iraqi Refugee (Haraka al-Mahdījīn al-ʿIrāqīyīn)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Founded by Iraqi refugee in Iran.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Founded</td>
<td>Notable Events</td>
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<tr>
<td>The SCIRI</td>
<td>The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (al-Majlis al-A'lı li-l-Thawra al-Islāmiya fl al-‘Irāq; SCIRI)</td>
<td>17 Nov. 1982</td>
<td>An umbrella organization founded by Māhmūd al-Ḥāshimī and Muhammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm in Teheran. It does not have fixed membership, and contains Sunni and Kurdish parties as well. Core organization is Advisory Council (Majlis al-Shūrā), which is divided into two parts in 1986, Central Advisory Council (Majlis al-Shūrā al-Markazīya), which contains more than 80 members, and General Organization (al-Hay'a al-‘Āmma). Most of the power is in al-Ḥakīm’s hand, and it comes to have single-party structure.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-SCIRI</td>
<td>The Militants 'Ulāmā’ in Iraq (‘Ulāmā’ al-Dīn al-Mujāhidīn fl al-‘Irāq)</td>
<td>Before 1981</td>
<td>It seems to have supporters in central area of the Euphrates river, especially in Kūt. Militant faction of this organization increases power calling itself Islamic Faith Movement. This movement occupies the organization itself in 1982, and renames to the Militants 'Ulāmā’ in Iraq. It recognizes 1920's Uprising as an ideal opposition, and claims to form the United Islamic Front (Jahība Islāmīya Muṭṭaḥidah).</td>
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<tr>
<td>The MAI and Subsidiary Parties of the MAI</td>
<td>The Islamic Task Organization (Munazzama al-‘Amal al-Islāmī, MAI)</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Organized by Muhammad Taṣqī al-Muddarissī based on the Marja 'īya Movement which was started by Muhammad al-Shūrāzī in the 1960s. Based in Karbalā’. It criticizes “political party” for being too western, and conducts its activities based on traditional networks of ‘ulamā’ and the religious establishment. Advisory Council (Majlis al-Shūrā) is core organization. Most of the power is in al-Muddarissī’s hand.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Islamic Alliance for Iraqi Students (al-Ithnāshīd al-Islāmī li-Tālaba al-‘Irāq)</td>
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<td>Student organization which conducts guerilla activities against the Ba'thist regime inside and outside Iraq.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small Parties</td>
<td>The Movement of Blood of Islamic Martyrdom (Haraka Damm al-Shahīd al-Islāmiya)</td>
<td>Before 1980</td>
<td>Founded inside Iraq. It changes name to the Call to the God (al-Daw’wa ilā Allāh) temporary, but backs the former name.</td>
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<td>The Movement of Islamic Agreement (Haraka al-Wiđāf al-Islāmi)</td>
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[Figure 1: Organizational Structure of the Da‘wa Party in the 1980s]

### Table 2: Ideological Shifts of the Da’wa Party

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<tr>
<td>Comprehensive socio-political reform by Islam</td>
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<td>Political role of the religious establishment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decision making in Advisory Council (Majlis al-Shura)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretive methods of activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Four stages of activities (reform, politics, revolution, rule)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peaceful political participation</td>
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<td>Political role of the ‘ulama’/leadership of authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overthrow of the Ba’ath regime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilization of masses, formation of vanguard</td>
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<tr>
<td>Applying Islamic law</td>
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<td>Formation of Islamic state</td>
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<td>Armed struggle for Islamic revolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Achievement of Islamic revolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-colonialism, anti the United State imperialism</td>
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<td>Liberation of the oppressed</td>
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<td>Ethnic-sectarian equal society</td>
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<td>Integration of Islamic parties/organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integration of Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi nationalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decentralization</td>
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<td>Expel of occupying military</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy, approval of plural values</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1) The party firstly asserted political participation based on decision of Advisory Council, then followed Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s Rule of Objective Authority theory, then opinions of the Jurisprudence Council headed by Kazim al-Ha’ifi from 1984, and finally most of the mainstream followed legal opinions of Muhammad Hussein Fadl Allith from 1988 [al-Khursan 1999: 418, 420].

2) Vanguard (vā’iṣa) meant the party itself in its document in the early days [al-Sadr 2005a: 707], the bylaws of the party in the 1980s stressed the importance of vanguard of masses as well [HDI n.d.: 120].

3) The party opposed firstly to colonialism in general, then to the United State imperialism in the 1980. After the Gulf War, however, they strongly criticized America for not helping the Shi‘a Uprising.

4) Their decentralization is to avoid ethnic and sectarian conflicts, not to establish federal state that the Kurdish parties, for instance, want to after the Iraqi War 2003.

**Table 3: The Ideologies of the Iraqi Islamist Parties in the 1980s**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Parties/Organizations</th>
<th>Foreign Relation</th>
<th>Domestic Politics</th>
<th>Social Relation</th>
<th>An Islamic Revolution</th>
<th>Other Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Ba’thist regime</td>
<td>The mustad’afīn</td>
<td>Masses within Iraq</td>
<td>- achievement of an Islamic revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Da’wa Party</td>
<td>- liberation from colonial dominations</td>
<td>- the U.S is great Satan</td>
<td>- supported by imperialism, injustice regime</td>
<td>- support for movement of the mustad’afīn, that of Palestine in particular</td>
<td>- liberation of Iraqi people from the oppressive regime</td>
<td>- collective leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the U.S is great Satan</td>
<td>- no legitimacy</td>
<td>- tries to divide the Iraqi Islamist movements</td>
<td>- stress the liberation of the mustad’afīn</td>
<td></td>
<td>- cooperation between the religious establishment and the Islamist parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- liberation from colonial dominations</td>
<td>- overtthrow the regime</td>
<td>- tries to divide ethnic and sectarian groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- cross ethnic-sectarian integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the U.S is great Satan</td>
<td></td>
<td>- liberation from colonial dominations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- call for joint struggle with Kurdish and Marxist organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the U.S is great Satan</td>
<td></td>
<td>- the U.S is great Satan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- ethnic sectarian equal society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soldier of Imam</td>
<td>- strong support to Khomeini</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Iraqi Mujāhidīn Movement</td>
<td>- dictatorship, Fascism or Naziism-like regime</td>
<td>- necessity of development compatible to the Iraqi society</td>
<td>- revolution of the mustad’afīn</td>
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<td>- strong support to Khomeini</td>
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<td>The Union of Iraqi Militant ‘Ulamā’</td>
<td>- enemy = Party of Satan = the United State</td>
<td>- the Ba’thist regime is struggle against American colonialism in order to protect Islam</td>
<td>- tries to divide the Islamist movements</td>
<td>- support to Wilāyata al-Faqīth theory of Khomeini</td>
<td>- support to Wilāyata al-Faqīth theory of Khomeini</td>
<td>- reception of Muhammad Bāṣir al-Ṣaḥr’s legacy</td>
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<td>- the United State</td>
<td>- the Ba’thist regime is struggle against American colonialism in order to protect Islam</td>
<td>- the Ba’thist regime is primary object</td>
<td>- ideal Islamic regime was established in Iran</td>
<td>- achievement of an Islamic revolution</td>
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<td>- Iraqi state must be ruled by Iraqi people</td>
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<td>- Iraqi refugee has been produced by the regime policy that has been trying to divide ethnic-sectarian groups</td>
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<td>Non-SCIRI</td>
<td>The Militant ‘Ulamā’ in Iraq</td>
<td>- the United State imperialism is hostile to Islamic revolution, tries to use containment policy by forces - against American imperialism and colonialism - struggle against Communism and American imperialism - the regime enters into alliance with world widen imperialism - distortion of Islamic belief - believes Western liberalism - dictatorship, Fascism or Nazism-like regime - liberation of the mustaḍīfīn is Islamic mission - liberation of the mustaḍīfīn under Khomeini’s leadership - cooperation with tribes of mid Euphrates river - denial of regionalism - struggle for Islamic Umma and Iraqi people - Khomeini is leader of Islamic Umma - The Islamic revolution of Iran is ideal revolution and establishes ideal regime - urgent need of a revolution and liberation of Iraq from the dictatorship - 1920’s Uprising is ideal opposition by Iraqi people - ‘ulamā’ should have political sense - integration of oppositional movements - overcome factionalism and individual interests of each organization</td>
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<td>- Jāḥiliyya typed regime - overthrow the dictatorship - ethnically sectarian exclusive nature - state terrorism - formation of leadership of the mustaḍīfīn - revolution of the mustaḍīfīn - mass movement in Iraq - support to Wilāyā al-Faqīh theory of Khomeini - formation of an Islamic state - each country should have regional Islamic readership - leadership of the religious authority has ultimate legitimacy - members of leadership should be elected by the people - importance of mass revolution - political party, organization</td>
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<td>Sunni, Shi’a</td>
<td>The Islamic Front for Liberation of Iraq</td>
<td>- remove exploitation by the colonialism - support to other Islamist movements trying to liberate from domination of colonialism or dictatorship - supported by the United State colonialism - agitates racism and sectarianism - extremely oppressive - part of the struggle of the mustaḍīfīn - dispatch delegation consisted of representatives from each organization inside Iraq to Iran - The Iranian regime is responsible for adjusting all the Islamist movements and developing the Muslim solidarity - hope to revolution, now that conditions already exist - denial of all ethnic and sectarian discriminations in all agendas - demand for security and human rights - administration should be conducted by Shīrāz whose member is elected by people</td>
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<td>The Movement of Blood of Islamic Martyrdom</td>
<td>- Khomeini is leader of all Islamist movements - support to Wilāyā al-Faqīh theory of Khomeini - voice of martyrdom is precious regardless to ethnic and sectarian groups</td>
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<td>- organize mujāhidin inside Iraq - formation of vanguard (talī‘a) by students</td>
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Note: 1) included ideology of the Islamic Fatah Movement, because the Militants ‘Ulamā’ in Iraq changed it name to the Islamic Fatah Movement in 1982.
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<th>MAI ³</th>
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- = strongly stress, ○ = stress, Δ = approval, ✓ = no reference (confirmed), Blank = no reference (without confirmed)

Note: 1) HDI; the Islamic Da‘wa Party (Ḥizb al-Da‘wa al-Islāmiyya)
2) SCIRI; the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (al-Majlis al-'A'lā li-l-Thawra al-Islāmiyya fī al-'Irāq)
3) MAI; the Islamic Task Organization (Mu‘azzama al-‘Amal al-Islāmiyya)
4) JUMI; the Union of Iraqi Militants ‘Ulamā‘ (Jamā‘a al-‘Ulamā‘ al-Mujāhidīn fī al-‘Irāq)
5) UDMI; the Militants ‘Ulamā‘ in Iraq (‘Ulamā‘ al-Dīn al-Mujāhidīn fī al-‘Irāq)
6) HMI; the Iraqi Mujāhidīn Movement (Ḥarakat al-Mujāhidīn al-‘Irāqiyyīn)
7) KITI; the Islamic Bloc for Liberation of Iraq (al-Kutla al-Islāmiyya li-Taḥrīr al-‘Irāq)

Note: 1) The chairman and spokesman exchanged their post in 1986; Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm became the chairman, and Mahmūd al-Ḥāshimī became the spokesman.

2) On the members of the council, see Table 5.

3) Formed in 1986, it includes 80–83 members; it theoretically acts as a monitoring body to check and balance the activities of the Central Advisory Council.

4) Formed in 1986, it has a real power in the organization of the SCIRI.

5) Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm controlled the activities of the Executive Committee from around 1986.

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<tr>
<th>Member</th>
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<td>Arab</td>
<td>Leader of the Badr Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1) “1st” indicates members of 1st Period (of the Assembly of Advisory Council in 1982). 2) “2nd” indicates members of 2nd Period (of the Assembly of Central Advisory Council in 1986–90). 3) “Independent” indicates members who are pro-al-Ḥākim family, or pro-SCIRI. 4) “Δ” indicates members who attended to the Assembly in 1986, but whose membership of the SCIRI’s Central Council after that assembly is unknown.
5) “HI” indicates the *Kurdish organization of Islamic Movements (al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya)*, which is pro-al-Ḥakīm family.

*1 The ratio of ‘ulamā’ increased around 8–24%; from 56% in the 1st Period (9 out of 16) to 64–80% in the 2nd Period (9 out of 14, or 8 out of 10 if calculated members whose information were confirmed only).

*2 The ratio of pro-Ḥakīm family member increased approximately 7–30%; from 50% in the 1st Period (8 out of 16) to 57–80% in the 2nd Period (8 out of 14, or 8 out of 10 if calculated members whose information were confirmed only).


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**Table 6: A General Comparison—the Da’wa Party, the SCIRI, and the MAI—**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Da’wa Party</th>
<th>The SCIRI</th>
<th>The MAI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Founded in</td>
<td>October 1957</td>
<td>November 1982</td>
<td>1976 (as movement from the 1960s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of foundation</td>
<td>Al-Najaf/Karbala</td>
<td>Teheran</td>
<td>Karbala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>‘ulamā’ → lay</td>
<td>‘ulamā’</td>
<td>‘ulamā’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of leadership</td>
<td>‘ulamā’ + lay intellectual</td>
<td>Mostly ‘ulamā’ (+lay intellectual)</td>
<td>‘ulamā’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network of ‘ulamā’</td>
<td>Al-Sadr family (al-Kazimiyah/al-Najaf)</td>
<td>Al-Ḥakīm family (al-Najaf)</td>
<td>Al-Shīrāzī and al-Mudarrisī families (Karbala)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational structure</td>
<td>Highly organized, pyramid-typed hierarchical structure</td>
<td>Umbrella organization → single party</td>
<td>Traditional network-typed, based on the Shi‘ite religious establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>Intellectual + masses</td>
<td>Mass + intellectual</td>
<td>Elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization type</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Ideology + family network</td>
<td>Ideology + family network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters/ main branches</td>
<td>Teheran/Damascus/London</td>
<td>Teheran/Qom/Damascus</td>
<td>Teheran/Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Islamism</td>
<td>Pan-Islamism</td>
<td>Pan-Islamism (strong pan-Shi‘ism)</td>
<td>Pan-Islamism (relatively strong pan-Shi‘ism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation with Iran</td>
<td>Relatively independent</td>
<td>Strong dependent</td>
<td>Dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period of activities within Iraq</td>
<td>23 years</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 years (as movement 15 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period of activities in Iran</td>
<td>8 years (23 years)</td>
<td>21 years</td>
<td>23 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq nationalism</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Relatively weak</td>
<td>weak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1) calculated years from their foundation until the Iraqi War 2003 (however, each parties conducted activities in Kurdistan region and the southern marsh after the exile in 1980, which periods are excluded).

2) Headquarter of the Da’wa Party moved from Teheran to Damascus in 1988 (number in the parentheses shows the years of Teheran branch).

Source: Made by author based on various sources.
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**BI:** al-Badīl al-Islāmī. 1986–1992, (The Organ of the SCIRI).


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———. 1981–89. Thaqāfā al-Da’wa al-Islāmīya, 4vols. n.p.: Manshūrât Ḥizb al-Da’wa al-Islāmīya.
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2. Secondly Sources


